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Female ownership, firm age and firm growth: Evidence from South Asian firms 
 
 
Abstract: This study investigates the role of female ownership, and its moderating role in 
shaping the effect of firm age and access to finance on firm growth. We use a sample of 7,203 
firms in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan and a mixed effects model, where both firm and regional 
characteristics are included. First, we test how women’s ownership affects two measures of firm 
growth (employment growth and Birch Index). Second, we investigate how women’s ownership 
influences the relationship between firm age and access to finance for firm growth. Our results 
indicate that gender is an important determinant of firm growth, but this is closely tied to firm 
age, access to finance, and varies with region and country. We conduct a robustness check using 
firm productivity instead of growth and we find largely opposite results for productivity 
compared to employment growth ownership. We also identify questions that emerge from our 
findings for managers and policy makers interested in women-owned firms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
…its potential is undermined by inequalities, including gender inequalities across all dimensions 
of economic and social life… Such impediments prevent South Asia from achieving truly equitable, 
inclusive and sustainable development (UN-ESCAP, 2015). 
 
Policymakers around the world point to the promise of female economic participation, 
particularly through business ownership (UN-ESCAP, 2013), as a means to achieve economic 
growth and reduce poverty and inequality (see Cuberes and Teigner, 2016; Cuberes et al., 2016). 
However, harnessing the promise of female business owners is uneven in different contexts: for 
example, women own less than 10 percent of formal small and medium enterprises in South 
Asia, compared with 38 to 47 percent in East and Central Asia and Eastern Europe (World Bank 
Group, 2014). 
Gender can have direct and indirect effects on firm activities and performance (Estrin and 
Mickiewicz, 2011), such as exports, profits, innovation and various types of firm growth. The 
role of owner gender in firm growth has been addressed from a very general standpoint (Ahl, 
2006; De Bruin et al., 2007). Most prior studies focus on factors for firm growth like education 
and work background of women owners, motivation, skills, networking, and corporate 
entrepreneurship. Despite study of firm size and age on firm growth (see Haltiwanger et al., 
2013; Birch, 1987), and the role of capital (see Coleman, 2007; Marlow and Patton, 2005), there 
has been limited investigation of the interplay between female ownership, firm age and access to 
finance on firm performance (see Denzo and Ross, 2012; Coleman, 2007; Marlow and Patton, 
2005).  
This knowledge gap is particularly wide for developing countries, as most research on 
components of these relationships is based on evidence from developed countries, such as the 
United States, Spain or Denmark (Shrader et al., 1997; Kochan et al., 2003; Alonso-Almeida, 
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2013; Brush et al. 2017). Due to differences in institutional constraints and even physical barriers 
(e.g. personal safety) for women, findings from the extant research on developed countries are 
difficult to translate and apply to developing contexts like South Asia, where women face 
pervasive barriers (UN-ESCAP, 2015; Solotaroff and Pande, 2014) that can be deeply embedded 
(see Gaur et al. 2014). In addition, many developing countries are introducing reforms related to 
the legal gender gap (World Bank, 2019), so the environment in which women business owners 
operate can be changing rapidly. 
 In order to address this knowledge gap, we investigate women ownership in firm growth 
across the lifecycle of a firm, as well as the interplay of access to finance. Our cross-sectional 
data includes 7,203 firms in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan over two periods during 2007-2014. 
First, we explore growth in women-owned firm, focusing on employment-based measures of 
growth. Second, we apply a mixed effects multilevel model to test for the influence of a women 
owner in firm growth, as well as the role of firm age and access to capital. We also conduct a 
robustness check using productivity growth.  
Our multilevel model allows us to account for a firm’s embeddedness in two 
geographical contexts tied to regional and country location in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. 
We use two samples for India to account for potential dynamics tied to three states. We consider 
some key regulatory, normative and cognitive factors in South Asia in our multi-level model. 
Our results indicate a highly nuanced influence of women ownership, which can vary 
based on firm characteristics as well as the type of firm growth measure being studied. We find 
that a woman owner has a positive influence on employment growth across the three countries in 
our study, as well as on a firm’s overall job creation power (Birch Index) in Bangladesh and 
Pakistan, and in three key Indian states. We find mixed results for women-owned firms along the 
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firm lifecycle and under capital constraints, compared to men-owned firms. Employment growth 
is slower in women- than men-owned firms along the firm lifecycle compared to the startup 
period for all except Bangladeshi firms, where it continues to be higher through 3-7 years. The 
Birch Index in women owned firms is smaller for those in Pakistan and in one India sample, but 
we do not find significant differences in our overall Indian sample. We also find that the Birch 
Index is larger for Bangladeshi firms for the period of 3-7 years compared to 0-3 years, after 
which the effect disappears.  
We find mixed results for women-owned firms facing capital constraints, with a negative 
effect on employment growth in India, and a negative effect for job creation power (Birch index) 
in Indian and Pakistani firms. Finally, women-owned firms in India have rising labor 
productivity along the firm lifecycle, compared to 0-3 years. We also find largely different 
results for employment growth and our robustness check using productivity growth.  
Our findings link firm age and feminist theories within the region and firm perspective, 
offering nuance to understanding growth outcomes of women-owned firms in some developing 
contexts. We find that heterogeneity in firm growth outcomes matters, and that a “one size fits 
all” approach does not advance understanding on womens’ business ownership outcomes.  
Our findings are useful to female owners in South Asia who may be considering when to 
invest in building financial and social networks in the lifecycle of the firms. Our findings could 
also be useful for investors and development interventions focused on women owned businesses. 
Our findings on when an increase in productivity may be seen, and in what region, raise 
questions for significant further investigation. Our work could also help policymakers who are 
considering if and how to support women in business. 
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We provide context on our study next, and 
we develop our framework in Section 3. We explain our data, variables and method in Section 4, 
followed by results in Section 5. We discuss implications of the study and conclude in Section 6. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
We contextualize our study by first assessing the state of current knowledge (see Gaur 
and Kumar, 2018) on female ownership in various institutional contexts. We identify key studies 
based on articles identified by keywords in leading international business, management and 
entrepreneurship journals, with a focus on 2006 onwards. The last two decades have seen 
growing interest in women in business (Rosa et al. 1996; Fairlie and Robb, 2009; Dezsö and 
Ross, 2012) but consensus on empirical evidence specifically on women and firm growth is 
elusive (Chirwa, 2008; Krishnan and Park, 2005; Du Rietz and Henrekson, 2000). In fact, a lack 
of consensus on approach, variable selection, and empirical technique on this question indicates 
the need for personal review related to availability of the data and prior research.  
The existing literature points to mixed evidence on the direct effect of women ownership 
on firm growth. Some studies find that women-owned firms underperform men-owned firms (see 
Du Rietz and Henrekson, 2000; Fairlie and Robb, 2009) while others find that women-owned 
firms outperform men-owned firms (see Davis et al. 2010) or have no difference (Watson and 
Robinson, 2003).  
While prior studies recognize that key factors, like resource allocation and network 
constraints, can affect women-owned firms, they do not typically consider their separate effects 
in empirical work (see De Bruin et al. 2007; Alfonso-Almeida, 2013). To better understand how 
women ownership can shape firm growth, we consider factors that enable women's involvement 
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in decision making and firm ownership. It is also important to consider the lifecycle of firm, 
since a firm’s needs and contributions at different stages of its lifecycle can vary (see Hyytinen 
and Maliranta, 2013), including need and access to growth-related resources. We elaborate on 
these factors as we develop our framework and empirical approach. 
We are interested in the South Asian context in order to fill a gap in knowledge because 
the existing research on firm growth in general, and on women-owned firms specifically, has 
focused on advanced economies and given less attention to developing economies (Krasniqi and 
Desai, 2016; Dezsö and Ross, 2012)1.  Much conceptual development on women in business 
originated in the study of advanced economies, rendering it contextually difficult to transfer 
assumptions to developing settings (see Desai et al., 2014). For example, some studies on firm 
growth have been conducted on the United Kingdom (Johnson and Storey, 1993) and United 
States (Fairlie and Robb, 2009; Brush et al. 2017). Yet while many developed economies 
mandate and enforce policies to increase gender representation, these types of reforms tend to be 
slow in developing economies (see Krasniqi and Desai, 2015). 
2.1. Women’s ownership and firm growth 
Liberal feminist theory offers a starting point for our research. It posits that “men and 
women are essentially equal, but that women work at a disadvantage due to a lack of personnel, 
of financial resources or of access to power networks” (Alfonso-Almeida, 2013: 621). Liberal 
feminists argue that each woman has the right and ability to her own equal rights via her actions 
and choices (Fischer et al. 1993). Liberal feminism suggests that firm growth is a function of 
 
1 To some extent, the three countries in our sample offer a type of natural experiment, as all were part of British 
India: India and Pakistan were partitioned in 1947, followed by independence of Bangladesh (formerly East 
Pakistan) in 1971. Since and during the period 1947-1971, the countries diverged tremendously, not only in 
economic performance but also in social environment, governance and political conditions. Institutional transition 
has not been smooth or homogeneous across the three countries and their regions, cities and industries.  
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organizational inputs, and gender differences are attributable to individual decision-making and 
managerial experience (see Orser et al., 2010).  
This is meaningful because leadership in a firm can influence firm outcomes through 
decisions about resource allocation, firm goals, strategies and other internal and external firm-
organizing activities (see Fairlie and Robb, 2009). Outcomes of women-owned firms can be 
affected by the mechanisms shaping their access to capital and labor resources. In some 
countries, legal and labor market regulations have reshaped the gender landscape of economic 
participation, paving the way for greater engagement of women in business. From a liberal 
feminist perspective, this implies that when women have the right and ability to participate 
equally (Fischer et al., 1993), there is no reason to expect different outcomes of economic 
activities undertaken by women compared with men.  
Where legal requirements and labor markets reduce barriers or even promote women’s 
participation in business, women should be able to take advantage of opportunities and access to 
resources similarly as men. In industries or occupations which are dominated by women, 
business activities by women may be accelerated, and networks embedded within those 
industries could favor women. Women can bring diversity of ideas, experiences, and market 
perspectives to the table, which can open new opportunities or business activities and processes. 
Thus, women can contribute to problem-solving (Van Knippenberg et al., 2004) through 
creativity (Kochan et al., 2003), thus boosting firm performance especially when women bring 
fresh eyes in industries which have previously been male-dominated. 
This all suggests that we should expect a neutral (equal) impact of women owners on 
firm performance compared with men. However, the South Asian context complicates this 
8 
 
expectation with three clusters of barriers that offer a reason to be more pessimistic: informal 
institutional barriers, formal institutional barriers, and physical barriers. 
Socialization plays a central role in explaining business outcomes in the liberal feminism 
research (Alonso-Almeida, 2013). This parallels the importance of informal institutions related 
to social and cultural trends in the environment in which women business owners operate. Social 
capital, which includes resources within the connections networks of an owner, is largely 
construed as a positive force for entrepreneurs in studies on advanced economies (Lindvert et al., 
2017). However, it cannot be ruled out that social capital could actually put firms at a 
disadvantage if it limits access to resources or inhibits action (see Wang et al., 2017). If 
masculine stereotypes dominate the context (see Schein 2007), social capital could more deeply 
embed stereotypes by concentrating access to networks and resources among men. Theorized 
diversity gains from women’s problem solving and creativity (Van Knippenberg et al., 2004; 
Kochan et al., 2003) could be lost if the female presence complicates decision processes and 
raises their costs. For example, gender discrimination related to cultural expectations by others in 
the supply chain, such as buyers, suppliers and investors (Weiler and Bernasek, 2001), could 
make interactions more difficult. 
Formal institutional barriers can exist in legal and regulatory systems, and can result 
from, e.g., educational systems, banking regulations, health systems, and inheritance laws. These 
can affect the participation and access of women to business opportunities. The 2018 Women, 
Business and the Law Report (World Bank, 2018) reveals that while progress has been made in 
the legal environment for women in the countries in our sample, there are still notable gaps. 
Some examples follow. Women can sign contracts and open banks accounts in the same way as 
men in all three countries. However, the law in all three countries does not prohibit 
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discrimination by creditors based on sex or gender in access to credit. In India, women cannot 
work the same night hours as men. In Pakistan, women cannot legally register a business in the 
same way as a man. While men and women have equal ownership rights to immovable property 
in all three countries, daughters and female surviving spouses do not have equal rights to inherit 
assets in both Bangladesh and Pakistan. Even with equal inheritance laws in place, it requires 
that women are aware (e.g. access to information), willing (e.g. going against brothers or sons), 
and able to enforce the law (e.g. accessing courts with backlog and being able to finance the 
claim). If female heirs receive nothing or face difficulty accessing inheritance, this can have real 
economic consequences which could affect firm growth, e.g. through effects on direct financing 
of the business or activities that build a track record. Capital from inheritance can be used for 
education and training, subsidizing or offsetting household support needs to enable work outside 
the home, and startup costs like registering a business, acquiring production assets, etc.  
A third set of barriers relates to physical safety, such as violence and safety, travel and 
transportation, which can put real constraints on mobility and access of women to regular 
business functions. Solotaroff and Pande (2014: xxvi) point out that women and girls in South 
Asia face a range of types of violence throughout their lives, presenting a serious problem that is 
difficult to quantify. Sexual exploitation of women in India, closely connected to domestic 
violence, can spill into the streets, creating fear and restricting mobility for women (see 
Bhattacharya, 2013). These dynamics can also affect ability to concentrate at school or at work 
(see Solotaroff and Pande, 2014) and in this manner, limit advancement in acquiring degrees or 
skill, which can limit future ability to engage in business activities. Women may have the right to 
travel outside the home in the same way as men (World Bank, 2018), but there still can be de 
facto risks associated with travel. Women owners who need to visit production facilities may 
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face greater threats to personal security than men owners. They may not safely be able to travel 
to certain areas or even during certain parts of the day, limiting firm growth due to greater 
difficulty performing business operations. 
Given the above combination of theory-driven optimism and context-driven pessimism, it 
is not possible to reasonably hypothesize on the direction of the effect of female ownership on 
firm performance in the South Asian context. However, given the central role of the business 
owner in driving firm outcomes (Robb and Fairlie, 2009), we expect that:  
H1: Female ownership is a significant factor driving firm growth in South Asia. 
3.2. Female ownership, firm age, and firm growth in South Asia  
Firm age is a key factor shaping firm performance (Coad, 2018) and an important 
consideration in understanding the performance of women-owned businesses (Robb and Watson, 
2012). A key challenge in unpacking the gender-firm growth relationship is that the needs of a 
firm can change over time.  
Greiner (1972) laid out a model of firm growth comprising five phases, each the result of 
a “crisis”. The ability of a firm’s owner to manage each crisis is, to a large extent, dependent on 
ability to mobilize resources internal and external to the firm, to mitigate the crisis. The first 
phase for a new firm is growth through creativity, prompted by a crisis of leadership. After this, a 
firm grows through direction, prompted by a crisis of autonomy. Once the firm has survived this, 
it seeks growth through delegation, as a response to a crisis of control. The fourth phase of 
growth, as the firm is maturing, is growth through coordination, resulting from a crisis of red 
tape. Finally, the mature firm grows through collaboration, a response to undefined crisis.  
Each crisis represents a marker which could deepen the advantage or disadvantage that a 
business owner faces, in building relationships, hiring, accessing capital, and managing other 
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resources needed to grow the firm. Each next phase of the business may require different or 
greater resources to overcome, placing greater value on the track record of the owner.  
We expect that the South Asian context places difficulty on female owners as their firms age and 
require greater resources. Traditional family and social structure in South Asia are also relevant 
as it could be that women are discouraged from working as they take on family responsibilities 
(see Still and Timms, 2000; Saari and Trihopoulou, 2003; Morris et al., 2006). A woman may 
close or leave the business, or it may be taken over by a spouse or a family member as it grows. 
Social capital, though usually considered to help business owners, could be a challenge in 
contexts where women face women limited social capital access outside the family or 
community (see Lindvert et al., 2017). For example, if a woman owner uses personal or family 
financing at the birth of her firm, and grows it to the point where it has export potential, the next 
step may require a significant capital infusion to scale production. This could mean she needs to 
seek external institutional channels for capital, which can open opportunity for gender 
discrimination and raise questions about collateralization and ownership of assets, which can be 
shaped by formal institutions favoring men.  
Women may also face a disadvantage related to building relationships with bureaucrats, a 
relevant constraint for firms in South Asia, and may have to divert resources from growth-
oriented activities to do so. In fact, men and women owned firms in Bangladesh report that a 
senior manager spends on average 4.2 percent and 4.8 percent of time dealing with regulators, 
respectively. In India, the difference in even larger: men owned firms report a senior manager 
spends on average about 4.6 percent of time dealing with regulators, compared to almost double 
- 8.9 percent – spent in women owned firms (World Bank, 2014). 
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It is difficult to reasonably predict how women-owned firms grow along the firm 
lifecycle. Based on a liberal feminist perspective, we would expect no real difference between 
women- and men-owned firms in contexts where women do not face the types of barriers 
described earlier. The three barriers described above call attention to the difficulties facing 
women business owners in South Asia. And, although South Asia had the fewest number of 
reforms related to the legal gender gap in the ten years leading to 2017, it was also the region 
with the highest percentage of reforming economies2 (World Bank, 2019). 
Previous findings on the relationship between firm age and growth in the gender context 
have been mixed (Morris et al. 2006; Alonso-Almeida, 2013; Krishnan and Park, 2005). Some 
find that women-owned firms are likely to have fewer employees (Sarri and Trihopoulou 2005) 
as the firm ages, whereas other studies highlight that businesses are most at risk at the early 
stages (Robb and Watson, 2012) and that women-owned businesses tend to be younger than 
men-owned firms as they are more likely to exit the market over time (Rosa et al., 1996).   
3.3. Female ownership, access to capital, and firm growth in South Asia 
Using the lens of social feminist theory, women may have less access to financial 
resources than men (see Ahl, 2006; Orser et al., 2010) because the broader economic and social 
context favor masculine culture. For example, women-owned firms tend to start with less capital 
than men-owned firms (Marlow and Patton, 2005; Alsos et al., 2006; Fairlie and Robb, 2009), 
implying they have fewer resources to invest in growth-oriented activities. Gendered access to 
resources from the start will logically influence growth outcomes in the future.  
 
2 World Bank (2019) assesses reforms across and within regions for the period 2007-2017, and tracks a wide range of 
indicators related to the legal gender gap, including measures related to business and employment participation of 
women. Improvement by region could reflect both action taken as well the baseline of protections in a country. 
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After the startup stage, women likely lack access to types of finance more often 
associated with growth, such as venture capital (see Morris et al., 2006)3. When men can more 
easily obtain financing than women (Coleman, 2007; Alonso-Almeida, 2013), they are at an 
advantage for future growth (see Alsos et al., 2006). Access to capital affects the ability of 
women-owned firms to hire labour, invest in growth-oriented activities and business 
development, and grow (Dezso and Ross, 2012), particularly in industries which require large 
immediate costs such as purchase of raw materials, and in companies which must be financially 
prepared to manage cash flows. 
Access to capital is a significant barrier for entrepreneurs around the world, and for 
women entrepreneurs specifically (see Alonso-Almeida, 2013; Dezso and Ross, 2012). This 
bears out in the trend in South Asia: the firms in our sample show large differences in access to 
capital. For example, 56 out of 100 companies run by a woman secured external funding 
compared to 75 out of 100 companies run by a man (World Bank Enterprise Surveys). While we 
would not expect a difference between women and men-owned firms’ growth outcomes where 
resources are equitably accessible, financial barriers in the South Asian context introduce some 
pessimism, so it is difficult to hypothesize on the direction of the relationship in this context. 
 
3. DATA AND METHOD 
We are able to leverage what is effectively a natural socioeconomic experiment of shared 
history and regional conditions, as we use three countries that were part of British India: India 
and Pakistan were partitioned in 1947, followed by the independence of Bangladesh (formerly 
 
3 It is also relevant to note more broadly that venture capital serves few entrepreneurs, even in countries where 
volume and size of the industry is large. For example, less than 1 percent of employer firms (firms with employees) 
in the United States reported using venture capital in the 2016 Census Bureau Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs.  
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East Pakistan) in 1971. The countries diverged tremendously since partition and independence, 
not only in economic performance but also in social environment, governance and political 
conditions. Institutional transition has not been smooth or homogeneous across the three 
countries and their regions, cities and industries.  
3.2. Sample 
Our main data source is the Enterprise Surveys, a firm-level dataset produced by the 
World Bank (www.enterprisesurveys.com) in two waves on a rotating sample during 2007-2013. 
We also use country-level data from the World Development Indicators for control variables. 
The Enterprise Survey compiled from face-to-face interviews with firm representatives 
and provides information on many trends relevant to a firm (e.g. leadership and ownership, 
human capital, performance, industry and business environment, infrastructure, technology, 
export orientation, and institutional characteristics), as well as region and country. The dataset 
provides exclusively cross-sectional information data (Chirwa, 2008; Rosa et al., 1996) which 
dates three years for a focal firm input. Two waves of the Enterprise Surveys were available for 
Bangladesh and Pakistan, and only one wave (2014) was available for India.  
After cleaning the data for outliers, we used the maximum number of observations 
available for non-missing values for our model and replaced non-responses or all non-applicable 
with missing values. We obtain a final pooled sample of 7,203 observations (firms) for our main 
sample (using employment and Birch Index as dependent variables) and 6,508 firms for our 
robustness check sample (using firm productivity as the dependent variable). Out of 7,203 firms 
in our main sample, 5,547 firms were in India (including 910 firms in Maharashtra, Karnataka, 
and Delhi), 1,066 firms in Bangladesh, and 590 firms in Pakistan.  
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Note that our final sample was built based on available data constrained by female 
ownership in 1,137 out of 7,203 firms. All firms in the Enterprise Survey could not be present in 
our sample due to data limitations and survey inconsistencies across countries, given the cross-
sectional nature of the data. The Enterprise Survey sampling was stratified and differential 
sampling was employed. This is why individual observations were weighted by the inverse of 
their probability of selection. Probability weights were applied by Enterprise Survey 
methodology.  
Variables, sources and descriptive statistics for the full sample, women- and men-owned 
subsamples are listed in Table 1. Correlations for the full sample are reported in Table 2.  
 
-INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE- 
3.3. Dependent variable 
Finding a contextually suitable measure for firm growth is challenging, especially for 
developing countries which have high levels of informal economic activity, and across countries 
that may have varied accounting practices (see Krasniqi and Desai, 2016). Measures for firm 
growth can include monetary measures (sales, assets, profits) and employment growth. The 
problem with monetary measures is reliance on accurate reporting, and they do not take into 
account differences in relative prices, input proportions, and technologies. Some other measures 
do not reflect differences in firm activities by sector, for example between capital- and labor-
intensive sectors. We focus primarily on employment-based measures in our study because job 
creation is both closely linked to entrepreneurship in the literature and a key concern in many 
developing countries.  
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Following Fisher et al. (1993) and Alonso-Almeida (2013), we use employment growth to 
measure firm growth, measured as logdifference in number employees over three-year period: 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡) − ln⁡(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−3)    (1) 
where SIZEi,t is firms's I employment (full –time) at time t. 
Our second measure is the Birch Employee Growth Index (Birch, 1987). This reflects the 
job-creation performance of a firm by taking the product of absolute and relative job growth over 
three years for a firm. The Birch Index is useful because it enables comparison of firms of 
different sizes based on their job-creation power. We calculate employment growth (Birch, 1987) 
as follows: 
𝐵𝐼𝑅𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−3) ∗ ⁡(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡/𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−3)  (2) 
In addition to our two employment-based measures of firm growth, we conduct a 
robustness check using firm productivity. We combine two measures of firm performance (Fisher 
et al., 1993) to calculate firm productivity as change in productivity over three years of sales per 
employee, reported on the Enterprise Survey, over three-year period p: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = ln(
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡
) − ln⁡ (
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−3
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−3
) ,   (3) 
where 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is firm's sales at time t. We conduct this robustness check in light of significant 
heteroegeneity among firm outcomes (Audretsch et al., 2018). 
3.4. Explanatory and control variables 
Our key explanatory variable is woman owner, reflecting female ownership in a firm. It is 
measured as a binary variable from the Enterprise Survey: 1 = a woman owns a share of the 
business (owner or co-owner) and 0 = if otherwise. As with previous research (Brush, 1992), a 
firm is defined as being owned by a woman when the owner or a co-owner is a woman.  
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We use proxies for firm age in age bands to account for the importance of the lifecycle of 
a firm (Dunne and Higher, 1995; Scott and Bruce, 1987). Previous research identifies at least 
five stages of the lifecycle of a firm (Greiner, 1972) which reflect functional and operational 
changes as a firm ages, such as activities related to inception, growth, and maturity of a firm. We 
assume that these changes are related to firm age. We use the number of years since operations 
started, as identified in the Enterprise Survey, to generate five age groups: 0-3 years (group one: 
startup), 3-7 years (group 2), 7-15 years (group 3), 15-30 years (group 4), and 30 years plus 
(group 5). Group one serves as the reference category. The average shares of women-owned 
firms at various ages in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh for the years 2009-2014 are shown in 
Figure A1 in Appendix. Exponential trends show a negative slope for Pakistan, indicating 
decreasing women ownership as firms age; positive slope for Bangladesh, indicating increasing 
women ownership as firms age; and neutral slope for India.  
Our variable for access to finance comes from the Enterprise Survey and reflects the 
extent to which access to finance is considered an obstacle for business by firm representatives. 
It varies from zero (no obstacle) to one (moderate obstacle) and two (severe obstacle).  
We also control for the possible influence of women through non-ownership roles in 
firms, as employees. We use two variables for women’s labor participation in a firm, taken from 
the Enterprise Survey. First, we use women in non-production, measured as the percentage of 
females engaged in skilled (non-production) activities in a firm, which could also include women 
on the board (Davis et al., 2010; Dezso and Ross 2012), representing high-level female human 
capital. Second, we use women in production to capture female engagement at lower skill levels, 
measured as the percentage of women engaged in production activities in a firm. 
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We also control for other firm characteristics relevant to firm growth. Given that our 
sample is South Asian firms, we accommodate the potential dynamics of informality using a 
question from the Enterprise Survey. We use formal birth to capture if the firm was formally 
registered when it began operations (1 = yes, 0 = no). We do this because of the importance of 
registration status for firm growth, although it is still unclear whether firms register in order to 
pursue growth or if firms register once growth necessitates it (see Krasniqi and Desai, 2016). 
Including informality in our analysis is important as there could be a difference between when a 
firm opens and when it is formally registered (see Van Stel and Storey, 2004), as registration can 
happen after market entry in emerging and developing countries (see Aidis et al., 2012). 
In order to capture the importance of the regulatory environment (Djankov et al., 2002), 
we include dealing with regulations. This is taken from the Enterprise Survey and measured as 
the share of senior management time spent dealing with government regulations. Firm exports 
can be an important determinant of firm growth and is measured as the percentage of a firm’s 
sales from direct exports, taken from the Enterprise Survey. We measure digital readiness and 
the use of communications technologies in a firm, capturing if a firm reports in the Enterprise 
Survey that it communicates in the supply chain by using email and the web (internet). This is 
important for firm growth because technology could drive growth through greater ability to meet 
demand for production or lower employment because of redundancies. We identify firms which 
use foreign technology because access to technologies can improve productivity and 
competitiveness in local and regional markets (Belitski et al., 2016). This is measured using a 
dummy variable for technology transfer which identifies if a firm licenses foreign technology (1 
= yes, 0 = no) taken from the Enterprise Survey. 
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Although not a panel dataset, we also control for country unobserved characteristics like 
economic development, using GDP per capita in constant PPP for Bangladesh, India and 
Pakistan. This is taken from the World Development Indicators. In addition, we control for the 
regional fixed effect within each country using the mixed effect model approach.  
Finally, we use industry and year dummies to control for industry and time-specific 
effects, to account for possible variation in firm growth due to sector differences and firm 
characteristics within those industries (Smith et al. 2006; Belitski and Desai, 2015). We use the 
following 14 industries: garments, food, metals and machinery, electronics, chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals, wood and furniture, non-metallic and plastic materials, auto and auto 
components, other manufacturing, retail and wholesale trade, hotels and restaurants, other 
services. The other category is construction, transportation, etc. 
3.5. Empirical strategy 
We adopt the input–output model of a Cobb-Douglas production function, extended to 
include the role of women ownership in firm growth (Ahl, 2006; Smith et al. 2006; Dezso and 
Ross, 2012). As firms are nested in regions, and regions are located in countries marked by an 
institutional context (Audretsch et al. 2018; Gaur et al. 2014), we use a two-level mixed model 
where the first level of analysis is a firm and the second level is a geographic region in a country. 
The regional level can have important implications for firm performance. Access to larger labor 
markets allows firms to more easily access human capital necessary for operations. Also, culture 
and informal institutions vary across regions within a country and may affect decision making of 
women (see Smith et al. 2006; Autio et al. 2014).  Regional characteristics are thus explicitly 
embedded into explaining firm performance. We use regions identified in the World Bank 
Enterprise Survey (2014): Six in Bangladesh (Barisal, Chittagong, Dhaka, Khulna, Rajshahi, 
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Sylhet), twenty two in India (Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, 
Delhi, Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Jharkhand, Karnataka, 
Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab,  Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, 
Uttaranchal), and eighteen in Pakistan (Balochistan, Faisalabad, Gujranwala, Hub, Hyderabad, 
Islamabad, Islamabad/Rawalpindi, Karachi, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Lahore, Peshawar, Punjab, 
Quetta, Sheikhupura, Sialkot, Sindh, Sukkur and Wazirabad).  
We run our two-level (firm – region) analysis in five cycles: (1) all firms in the sample, 
(2) India-only firms, (3) India Global, including only firms in Maharashtra, Karnataka and 
Noida-New Delhi because these subnational units contain commercial cores of Bombay, 
Bangalore, and Noida-New Delhi, respectively, (4) Pakistan-only firms, (5) Bangladesh-only 
firms. Using the India Global sample in the analysis allows us to consider that region could 
influence firm growth areas with greater connectedness or more robust markets concentrated 
around core cities. This is informed by economic geography and regional economics research on 
the importance of region for firm growth, including regional institutions, agglomeration 
economies and labor markets, and industry clusters (Audretsch et al., 2018, Gaur et al. 2014). 
The regions in the analysis represent home state location as identified in the Enterprise Surveys.  
A nested mixed effect multilevel model allows us to use a hierarchical structure such that 
firms are nested into their respective regions4. Multi-level regression contains both fixed and 
random effects. Fixed effects are estimated in addition to being indirectly estimated by 
covariances of random intercepts and slopes (McCulloch et al., 2008; Rabe-Hesketh and 
 
4 There is the limitation of not able to estimate with three levels, by adding random effects equations at the firm 
level with nesting going to biggest (country) level. However, with three countries, a three level model has small 
added power. Our dependent variable is already captured at the firm level, nested within a region in one of the three 
countries. 
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Skrondal, 2012). We control for unobserved heterogeneity across regions using the following 
two-level random-intercept model:  
Eit = β0 +∑ 𝛽i𝑋it +
𝑘
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝛽iz𝑋itz + 𝑎𝑧 + 𝜆𝑡
𝑛
𝑧=1 +𝑒it   (4) 
where i=1,..., K; z=1,…..,N; t=1,...,T; Eit is firm growth i at time t nested in region z categorized 
by difference in employment, Birch Index and difference in productivity. 𝛽𝑖 is the corresponding 
coefficient of a vector Xit at a firm level with our variables of interest and control variables 𝛽𝑖𝑧 is 
the corresponding coefficient of a vector Xitz  at a regional -level. Xitz is a 1 × qi  vector of q 
regressors in a region z related to regional characteristics. Xit is a 1 × qi vector of qi regressors in 
a firm i specific controlling for regional effects of firm growth.  𝜆𝑡 is a time control. The random 
intercept is measured at region 𝑎𝑧level and captures unobserved heterogeneity in the regional 
context, e.g. culture, traditions, industry specialization, degree of openness in relation to our 
dependent variable (Acs et al. 2014). The random intercept is assumed independent and normally 
distributed with zero mean and constant variance. Following Goldstein (2005), the error terms 
are assumed to be independent with E(eit) = 0. and can therefore be directly estimated.  
We follow Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012) as there is no statistical justification for 
imposing any particular covariance structure between random effects at the onset of our analysis. 
We first explore a model with an unstructured random effects covariance matrix, which allows 
for distinct variances and covariances between all random effects covariates at the same level. 
We also perform robustness check at the start of our analysis by fitting mixed effects models 
with an exchangeable covariance structure at the second level, but the results of predicted 
margins and significance of coefficients do not change (both for the full sample and country-
specific samples) when various assumptions on covariance structure are imposed.  
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By using a mixed effect multilevel model, the influence of each level can be controlled 
for and measured, which is useful when dealing with possible endogeneity bias and potential 
spatial autocorrelation (Goldstein, 2005).  
 
4. RESULTS  
We use multilevel (two level) mixed effects model with a random intercept to examine 
how firm location and firm characteristics, including women ownership, firm age, and access to 
finance affect firm growth in a sample of 7,203 firms across 14 sectors in Bangladesh, Pakistan 
and India (2007-2014). We consider that both firm and external factors, such as regional and 
country characteristics (Belitski and Desai, 2015) can affect firm growth.  
We calculate the baseline (random intercept only) model (Specification 1, Tables 3-4) to 
obtain the interclass correlation coefficients (ICCs) or between firm regional variation (Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012). The intercept is statistically significant at the 1% level and ICCs 
are between 0.08 and 0.04 (Table 4), suggesting sufficient evidence to pursue multi-level 
modeling (McCulloch et al., 2008) and that the regional context has certain explanatory power of 
firm performance (Acs et al. 2014).  
Next, we estimate random intercept and fixed slope models with regressors at both the 
region and firm levels. Results in Table 3 refer to employment growth and results in Table 4 
refer to the Birch Index. The results in Tables 3 and 4 are reported as follows: full sample of 
7,203 firms (Specifications 2-3), India-only firms (Specifications 4-5), India Global firms 
(Specifications 6-7), Pakistan-only firms (Specifications 8-9) and Bangladesh-only firms 
(Specifications 10-11). We estimate the baseline model, as well as the baseline model modified 
to include an interaction term capturing women ownership, firm age and access to finance.  
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-INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE- 
 
Tables 3 and 4 show the estimated variance components. An LR test comparing the 
model with one-level ordinary linear regression is provided and is highly significant for all 
samples except Bangladesh in Table 4, advocating for multilevel modelling but a model without 
regional effects for Bangladeshi firms. This does not mean that two level modeling is not 
appropriate for Bangladesh, rather than higher homogeneity across Bangladeshi regions.  
The intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) measures the degree of correlation among 
observations within a region, and is a useful tool to evaluate how much of the total variance in 
firm growth that can be assigned to regional factors (Gaur et al. 2014; Acs et al. 2014). The ICC 
coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, where a value 0, indicates that the regional characteristics have no 
effect on dependent variable and 1 indicate that all units in the region are relevant (Goldstein 
2005; Nilsson et al. 2014). As shown in Tables 3 and 4, the estimated ICC varies between 0.02 
and 0.13 (2-13%) for the full sample, 0.02 and 0.08 (2-8%) for the India sample, and 0.02 and 
0.07 (2-7%) for the Indian Global sample. For Pakistan, the ICC is between 0.02 and 0.08 (2-
8%). For Bangladesh, the ICC varies between 0.02 and 0.03 (2-3%). The role of regional 
institutional characteristics is stronger in India than in Pakistan and Bangladesh which is likely 
due to greater differences in institutional and cultural context between regions in Pakistan and 
India, than Bangladesh. 
We find some interesting overall trends in firm growth for the region. Firms aged 7 years 
or more are likely to create fewer jobs than firms below 7 years of age, particularly in India 
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(Tables 3 and 4). However, once we account for a proportional contribution of firm growth using 
the Birch Index, this difference in job creation disappears (Table 4).  
Findings for the control variables are largely consistent for firm growth measured using 
employment (Table 3) and Birch Index (Table 4). We found a direct positive association between 
high skilled women (women in non-production) and firm growth for all firms, except Pakistani 
firms and India Global cities firms, where it is not significant. We find that firms which were 
formally registered at the time of birth employ fewer people (Table 3), as do firms which license 
foreign technologies (Table 3, 4). We find that firms using communication technologies (email 
and website) within their supply chains have greater employment growth in the full sample, as 
well as sample of Indian firms and Bangladesh firms (Table 3, 4). Use of email and web in 
Pakistani and India Global cities does not provide an additional competitive advantage. We also 
find that time dealing with regulations is positively associated with firm size (Tables 3 and 4).  
We now turn to our hypothesis, H1, which predicted that women ownership in a firm 
would be a significant factor for firm growth, but we were not able to predict a negative or 
position direction of the relationship. We find a weak positive effect for Bangladeshi firms 
(β=6.02; p<0.10). We do not find significant positive effects for the Indian and Pakistan samples. 
The effect turns positive when we control for firm lifecycle and capital constraint factors (Table 
3) for the full sample (37.89; p<0.01), Indian firms (β=33.47; p<0.01), Indian Global firms 
(β=139.2; p<0.01), Pakistan (89.23; p<0.01), and Bangladeshi firms (β=1.58; p<0.10). When 
using the Birch Index as the measure for firm growth (Table 4), we find a direct and significant 
effect for the full sample (β=6.79; p<0.01) and Bangladeshi firms (β=28.69; p<0.01). When 
controlling for firm age and capital constraints, firm age becomes positive and significant: 
(β=22.44; p<0.10), India Global firms (β=105.00; p<0.01), Pakistani firms (β=333.9; p<0.01) 
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and Bangladeshi firms (β=23.54; p<0.01). Interestingly, we find that in India, women ownership 
positively influences the Birch Index only in the India Global sample.  
We find mixed evidence on the role of firm age. Along the lifecycle since startup, 
employment growth in women-owned firms is slower than men-owned firms, for all except 
Bangladeshi firms. For Bangladeshi firms, employment growth continues to be higher in women-
owned firms through the period of 3-7 years (Spec. 11: β=37.96, p<0.01), after which the effect 
disappears (see Table 3). Along the lifecycle, being a women-owned firm is negatively 
associated with Birch Index (Table 4) for firms in the India Global sample and Pakistan sample. 
We do not find significant differences in the effect of firm age on Birch Index between women 
and men-owned firms in the overall Indian sample. Interestingly, female ownership is associated 
with higher Birch Index for Bangladeshi firms for the period of 3-7 years compared to 0-3 years, 
after which the effect disappears (Spec. 11: β=83.38, p<0.05).  
We find mixed evidence on women-owned firm growth under constrained capital access. 
We find that women-owned firms in India experiencing severe financial constraints are likely to 
have lower employment growth (spec. 4-5: β= -4.84, p<0.10) (Table 3). This is similar for Indian 
(β= -4.95; p<0.10) and Pakistani firms (β= -70.60; p<0.05) (Table 4) when the Birch Index is the 
dependent variable. In other words, women-owned firms that report access to finance as a severe 
barrier are less likely to hire more employees in India and Pakistan. Results are not statistically 
significant for Bangladeshi firms, meaning that women- and men-owned firms are likely to 
experience the same growth regardless of their relative difficulty in accessing capital.   
4.1. Robustness check 
We performed three types of robustness check in this study. First, we experimented with 
fitting mixed-effects models using exchangeable covariance structure and unstructured 
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covariance structure for model estimation at the second level. The results of estimation with 
predictive margins, significance of coefficients and standard errors has not proved to be different 
for the full sample or for the country-only samples. For all estimations, we assume independent 
covariance structure between the random effects; that is, all covariances are assumed to be zero. 
Second, the ICC is low for Pakistan and Bangladesh, and some region-specific effects do 
not change over time within the same firm location. A mixed effect model allows controls for 
region specific effects, but we also address this issue by exploiting fixed effects estimation as a 
robustness check (Wooldridge, 2002). We include country and regional dummies in the model 
controlling for country and regional -fixed effects when clustering standard errors. Results of the 
fixed effect model confirm our findings using mixed methods, both by calculating coefficients 
and statistics and by plotting predictive margins with 95% confidence intervals5. The major 
difference in two estimations is the significance of the coefficients is lower in mixed effect 
model but stronger in fixed effects model.  
We conduct a robustness check using a proxy for firm growth - productivity. Findings are 
reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. Noteworthy findings from the robustness check are as 
follows. Interestingly, the results for our robustness check are different from our main results on 
firm growth (Tables 3 and 4). We found partial support for H1, which predicted female 
ownership would be a significant factor driving firm growth. In contrast to some of the positive 
results using employment-based measures of firm growth, we find that women-owned firms in 
Pakistan have lower labor productivity (β=-1.33; p<0.01) . When controlling for capital barriers 
and firm age, we find lower productivity among women-owned firms in the India (β=-0.38; 
p<0.05) and Pakistan (β=-2.85; p<0.10) sample. Results for Bangladeshi firms are not 
 
5 Results are available from the authors upon request. 
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statistically significant. Although our main estimations show that firms which formally registered 
at birth and which license foreign technologies had fewer employees, we find they have higher 
productivity in the robustness check. 
The robustness check results are mixed for women-owned firms and firm age, as women-
owned firms are likely to increase productivity over the lifecycle compared to startup. This result 
is largely driven by Indian firms that exhibit higher productivity if they survive (0-3 years since 
establishment) but not Bangladeshi and Pakistani firms. When it comes to capital constraints, we 
find that access to capital is not associated with productivity except for Pakistani women-owned 
firms: Pakistani women-owned firms reporting severe capital constraints  (β=3.36, p<0.01) were 
more productive. Firm productivity is a difference in sales to employment ratio over time, which 
is inversely related to firm employment: an increase in the number of employees decreases the 
ratio. This explains differences in findings associated with the way productivity is calculated as a 
proxy for firm growth.  
In addition, we experimented with a lagged dependent variable as a control variable, but 
it was not statistically significant. A potential problem of such estimation is endogeneity in the 
data; given the cross-sectional nature of our data with two points in time available for each firm, 
a dynamic mixed effect model has weak statistical significance and the lagged dependent 
variable was not statistically significant. The data does not allow us to control for more than one 
lagged dependent variable on the right hand side (Wooldridge, 2002).   
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION   
We conduct a novel study on women owners and firm growth in South Asia, using firm 
age and access to finance as a prism for our analysis (Still and Timms 2000; Marlow and Patton, 
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2005; Smith et al. 2006). We use a sample of 7,203 firms in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan to 
investigate both direct and moderating effects. Our study extends previous research on the role of 
women owners in firm growth (Rosa et al. 1996; Fairlie and Robb, 2009; Dezsö and Ross, 2012) 
by building largely from liberal feminist theory to explain how women experience business 
ownership.  
We find that women-owned firms tend to have higher employment growth and higher 
Birch Index growth except for Global India regions. However, our robustness check using 
productivity as the dependent variable shows a negative effect of women ownership on 
productivity in Pakistani and Indian firms. Firms which hire more employees may not actually be 
more productive, unless sales change is greater than employment change (reflecting how 
productivity is calculated). This could also be driven by industry-specific characteristics which 
drive employment needs of growing firms, and industries with greater reliance on automation 
may see contrasting trends in employment and productivity growth. A single measure of firm 
growth is unlikely to account for such nuances adequately (see Krasniqi and Desai, 2015) and 
our findings demonstrate that firm growth should be examined from multiple perspectives and 
using both employment and non-employment based measures. Except for Pakistani firms, severe 
constraints when accessing finance were not found to affect firm productivity. For Bangladeshi 
firms, there may be a link to widespread microcredit financing,6 with a type of “leveling” the 
field phenomenon that may be related to the finding on productivity, similar to results from 
developed economies (Watson and Robinson, 2003). 
 
6 The microfinance industry in Bangladesh came out of Mohamed Yunus’ experiment with the traditionally unbanked, 
least creditworthy asset class – poor women. High repayment rates and the social gains assumed with microfinance 
led to rapid popularity of the industry, demonstrated by the proliferation of microfinance in Bangladesh, leading to 
massive and artificial injection of capital into the economy. It is not surprising that access to capital was not a 
significant negative factor for growth of women owned firms in Bangladesh. 
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Our findings also highlight the importance of considering that women’s ownership 
interplays with other factors – specifically, firm age and access to finance – to shape firm 
growth. Women-owned firms hire more people earlier in their lifecycle, with the number of 
employees decreasing with firm age. After controlling for the proportional contribution of firms 
of all sizes, this effect remains significant for Indian global regions and Pakistan, while we find 
no differences in job creation (Birch index) between women and men-owned firms overall and in 
firms outside Global Indian cities.   
Our results show that both firm age and severe capital constraints can limit growth in 
women-owned firms in the South Asian context. Severe financing difficulties are greater barriers 
for firm growth in India and Pakistan, but not do not hinder firm growth in Bangladesh. 
Interestingly, our robustness check indicated that access to capital is not associated with firm 
productivity, except for women-owned firms in Pakistan where severe barriers to finance are 
associated with more productivity. This implies a type of filtering of only the most productive 
women-owned firms which have been able to aggressively overcome financing barriers. 
Our findings may be useful to women business owners. For example, some regions may 
be more conducive for women-owned businesses in India. When women own or co-own 
businesses, being aware of the challenges particularly during the first 0-3 years can help them 
identify what areas of firm operations to concentrate efforts. A key finding of our study is that 
women access capital differently than men (see also Alfonso-Almeida, 2013), but we also find 
that productivity of women-owned firms improves with firm age. This draws attention to women 
owners to consider how and when to seek capital or other support to help manage productivity at 
very early stages.  
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Policymakers can consider some implications from our findings. Women-owned firms in 
Pakistan and India experience higher employment growth during early years (0-3 years) 
compared to later stages, while those which survived after the entry period demonstrate higher 
productivity over time, and in particular in India. Policymakers might consider how the lifeycle 
of the firm is relevant in their interventions based on if employment growth or productivity is the 
target. Policymakers could also consider how firm age matters if are considering targeting capital 
constraints.   
Our findings indicate there is value in considering the nuances of capital for Indian firms 
outside the India Global subsample. However, this is complicated to interpret because the 
subsample comprises states which contain key commercial cities. The broader areas outside the 
key cities should be investigated further to understand the immediate, within-state dynamics of 
firm growth, before prioritizing any appropriate policy.  
Our study confirms a gender gap in growth outcomes of women-owned firms, but that it 
is important to consider heterogeneity across firm characteristics, such as age, and types of 
growth. Our findings suggest that variations across regions, firm age, and many other firm 
characteristics are relevant considerations for policymakers to think about if they are considering 
targeted interventions.  
5.1. Limitations and directions for future research 
It is important to note several limitations about our study. As with many studies using 
data on developing contexts, we are constrained by availability and limitations of the data. In this 
study, we use proxies which adequately capture our variables of interest but leave some 
questions unanswered. Our main dependent variable, firm growth, uses employment-based 
proxies, which we consider appropriate measure given our context. It is important for 
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policymakers and women owners to consider that we use several explicit measures of firm 
growth, and findings apply as such. However, it is worth noting that employment may not always 
match other measures. For example, employment may fall due to automation but revenues of the 
firm may rise (see Krasniqi and Desai, 2016). As our robustness check indicates, employment 
and productivity can manifest opposing patterns.  A direction for future research is to better 
understand the link between employment growth and productivity (Autor and Salomons, 2018).  
We use a proxy for women’s ownership which captures if any of the owners is a women. 
As with previous research (Brush, 1992), a firm is defined as being owned by a woman when the 
owner or a co-owner is a woman. A limitation of this indicator that it cannot identify, in the case 
of more than one owner, characteristics of the other owner/s. For example, this does not reveal if 
a woman owns jointly with a spouse, which could be a salient question in South Asia because of 
the prevalence of family business in the economy (Economist, 2015; Carney and Gedajlovic, 
2002). Our findings should be taken as they relate to the variables used in our study; while it may 
be tempting to treat positive performance of women-owned firms as indicative of broader female 
empowerment, our findings do not provide supportive or contrary evidence on this link. 
Our final sample was built based on data on firm ownership with 1,137 women-owned 
businesses out of 7,203 firms. The Enterprise Survey sampling was stratified and differential 
sampling was employed; this is why individual observations were weighted by the inverse of 
their probability of selection. Probability weights were applied by Enterprise Survey 
methodology. However the use of the stratified sample may still include selection bias due to 
data limitations and survey inconsistencies across countries, given the data’s cross-sectional 
nature.  
32 
 
In this regard, an important methodological limitation relates to longitudinal data on firm 
ownership and survival. Such data would enable researchers to observe whether women 
ownership changes over firm’s lifecycle and how this change is associated with outcome 
indicators, such as job creation and productivity over time. For example, do women sell their 
firms earlier or later than men? 
Our study points to several directions for future work. An important question is on how 
women’s ownership is associated with a variety of measures of firm performance, including 
quality and quantity of job creation, product development, innovation, exports and so on. Non-
economic outcomes are of special interest and especially in the context of our sample, such as 
how female ownership of firms may be tied to broader economic empowerment of women. It 
would be fruitful to explore, for example, whether  ownership in firms leads to stronger financial 
security or participation in household decision-making, not only of the women owners but also 
of employees. The question of non-economic outcomes is salient also because women owners 
have been found to attempt to balance profits with non-economic goals, including 
accomplishment, professional development and helping others people by creating jobs (Brush, 
1992).  
Another direction for future research is to conduct multi-level analysis on individual and 
firm level data, to examine how individual personality traits are associated with different types of 
firm growth outcomes among women. This would also further calls for multi-level analysis of 
the factors driving firm entry and performance (Audretsch et al., 2018). An important question 
beyond South Asia is on the role of region and local context in shaping firm outcomes. Our 
findings for regions dominated by key cities in India raise questions about why women-owned 
firms in these regions perform better. It would be fruitful to ask, for example, if women might 
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leverage social capital better in agglomeration economies because they can access deeper and 
larger networks, or in smaller regions where they may be more deeply entrenched in networks. It 
is also worthwhile for future research to ask how specific inputs or institutional frameworks in 
regions shape firm growth. When it comes to access to capital, is it better for women to be in 
regions with greater density of financial services or smaller regions, if personal ties are stronger? 
Relatedly, future research on the relationship between firm age and size (e.g. Halitwanger 
et al., 2013) could seriously consider how women owners matter. For example, are women 
owners more effective in small or large firms, and at what ages, and in what places? 
Finally, further research specifically on the South Asian context is important because of 
disparities in economic, political and social life for women. The pace of institutional reforms, 
coupled with slow-changing norms and traditions, and their effect on women in business and 
related outcomes represents an important nexus for both future research and policy (see World 
Bank 2019, 2016; Cuberes and Teigner, 2016; Cuberes et al., 2016). 
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Table 1: Summary statistics and variable description for the full and split samples  
 
Variable Description 
All firms Women-owned firms  Men-owned firms 
Obs. Mean 
St. 
dev. 
Obs. Mean 
St.  
dev. 
Obs. Mean 
St.  
dev. 
Firm growth 
Difference in logs of firm employment in a current 
year and three years ago 
7,203 12.09 34.73 1,137 12.71 32.41 6,066 11.97 35.15 
Birch index Birch index (1987) of firm growth 7,203 14.44 62.87 1,137 26.74 95.54 6,066 12.13 54.31 
Firm productivity  
Difference in logarithms of sales per employee in a 
current year and three years ago 
6,508 0.11 0.57 1,036 0.10 0.74 5,472 0.12 0.53 
Age category  
Firm age: 1=start-ups (0-3 years); 2=survival (3-7 
years, 3=growth (7-15 years), 4=expansion (15-30 
years), 5=maturity(>30 years) 
7,203 3.69 0.95 1,137 3.80 0.91 6,066 3.66 0.95 
Obstacle finance 
Access to finance as obstacle: 0-no obstacle; 1 – 
moderate; 2 - severe 
7,203 0.16 0.36 1,137 1.00 0.00 6,066 0.00 0.00 
Female  
Are any of the owners female? 1-yes, zero 
otherwise 
7,203 9.39 26.05 1,137 17.45 34.49 6,066 7.88 23.85 
Exports Share of firm’s sales direct exports 7,203 0.56 0.75 1,137 0.58 0.76 6,066 0.56 0.75 
Female in non-production 
Share of female in total FTE who are non-
production worker (human capital) 
7,203 8.05 15.93 1,137 10.56 18.56 6,066 7.58 15.35 
Female in production 
Share of female in total FTE who are production 
workers (labor) 
7,203 2.40 5.41 1,137 2.55 5.06 6,066 2.37 5.47 
Email Email is used to communicate value chain 7,203 0.78 0.42 1,137 0.90 0.30 6,066 0.76 0.43 
Web Web is used to communicate value chain 7,203 0.47 0.50 1,137 0.59 0.49 6,066 0.45 0.50 
Dealing with regulations 
What % of senior management time was spent in 
dealing with government regulations? 
7,203 4.85 14.50 1,137 9.17 21.07 6,066 4.04 12.75 
Technology transfer 
Firm uses foreign technology: 1-yes, zero 
otherwise 
7,203 0.89 0.32 1,137 0.88 0.33 6,066 0.89 0.32 
GDP  GDP per capita in constant prices 7,203 10.50 0.26 1,137 10.46 0.28 6,066 10.51 0.26 
Formal registration 
Firm formally registered when it began operations: 
1-yes, zero otherwise 
7,203 0.06 0.25 1,137 0.03 0.18 6,066 0.07 0.26 
Note: Number of firms is 7,203  
Source: Enterprise Surveys World Bank Group (2014) during the 2007-2014 period for India, Pakistan and Bangladesh  
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    Table 2: Correlation matrix 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Firm growth 1              
2. Birch index 0.54* 1             
3. Firm productivity -0.24* -0.11* 1            
4. Age category -0.07* -0.02* -0.02* 1           
5. Obstacle finance 0.01 0.08* -0.01 0.05* 1          
6. Female 0.03* 0.18* 0.01 0.03* 0.13* 1         
7. Exports 0.04* -0.01 -0.01 -0.03* 0.01 -0.01 1        
8. Female in non-production 0.02 0.14* 0.01 -0.02* 0.06* 0.28* 0.05* 1       
9. Female in production 0.02* 0.04* -0.01 0.02* 0.01 0.10* -0.04* 0.25* 1      
10. Email -0.01 0.07* -0.01 0.01 0.12* 0.15* -0.13* 0.01 0.10* 1     
11. Web 0.02 0.13* 0.01 0.03* 0.10* 0.24* -0.09* 0.07* 0.13* 0.46* 1    
12. Dealing with regulations 0.02 0.04* 0.01 0.06* 0.12* 0.09* -0.02* -0.02* -0.01 0.03* 0.05* 1   
13. Technology transfer -0.07* -0.09* 0.04* 0.01 -0.01 -0.15* 0.08* -0.11* -0.12* -0.12* -0.24* -0.01 1  
14. GDP -0.01 -0.09* -0.01 0.03* -0.06* -0.13* -0.12* -0.21* -0.03* 0.17* 0.06* 0.01 0.03* 1 
15. Formal registration -0.01 -0.02* 0.02 -0.01 -0.05* -0.02* 0.02 -0.03* -0.03* -0.13* -0.07* -0.02 0.04* -0.02 
Note: * represents significance at the 5% level. The number of firms is 7,203. 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2014) during the 2007-2014 period for Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan.  
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Table 3: Mixed effects multivariate regression (DV – difference in logs of firm employment in a current year and three years ago) 
 Sample  
  
baseline 
all firms 
all firms all firms India India 
India 
Global 
India 
Global 
Pakistan Pakistan Bangladesh Bangladesh 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Age group 2 (3-6 years) 
  
  
0.30 
(4.20) 
3.91 
(4.46) 
-3.48 
(3.63) 
1.23 
(3.89) 
-12.32 
(10.94) 
24.04** 
(12.02) 
9.13 
(17.57) 
-12.17 
(18.88) 
24.86* 
(13.38) 
20.10 
(13.42) 
Age group 3 (7-14 years) 
  
  
-4.47 
(4.07) 
-0.50 
(4.33) 
-8.04** 
(3.51) 
-3.95 
(3.77) 
-23.59** 
(9.99) 
6.96 
(11.00) 
15.53** 
(7.68) 
11.57* 
(6.75) 
18.48 
(13.09) 
17.53 
(13.08) 
Age group 4 (15-29 years) 
  
  
-7.93* 
(4.06) 
-3.81 
(4.32) 
-10.80*** 
 (3.51) 
-6.84* 
(3.77) 
-25.46** 
 (9.90) 
5.35 
(10.91) 
3.49 
(6.44) 
12.47 
(6.52) 
13.88 
(13.06) 
14.14 
(13.03) 
Age group 5 (>30 years) 
  
  
-9.65** 
(4.11) 
-4.68 
(4.38) 
-12.89*** 
 (3.56) 
-7.98** 
(3.82) 
-27.0*** 
(9.93) 
4.13 
(10.94) 
7.49 
(5.14) 
19.02 
(12.02) 
13.59 
(13.26) 
14.26 
(13.28) 
Female (H1) 
  
  
1.02 
(1.14) 
37.89*** 
(12.58) 
0.23 
(1.04) 
33.47*** 
(10.23) 
0.93 
(3.49) 
139.2*** 
 (23.31) 
-11.14 
(10.14) 
89.23** 
 (42.06) 
6.02* 
 (3.16) 
1.58* 
 (0.70) 
Exports 
  
  
0.03* 
(0.02) 
0.03* 
(0.02) 
0.05*** 
(0.02) 
0.05*** 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.11) 
0.07 
(0.11) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
Obstacle finance 
  
  
1.36** 
(0.57) 
1.72*** 
(0.64) 
1.31** 
(0.54) 
1.89*** 
(0.61) 
5.71*** 
(1.65) 
5.04*** 
(1.83) 
1.32 
(3.69) 
2.33 
 (4.06) 
0.97 
(1.60) 
0.56 
(1.78) 
Female in non-production 
  
  
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.12) 
0.05 
(0.12) 
-0.59 
(0.54) 
-0.50 
(0.54) 
0.09 
(0.07) 
0.09 
(0.07) 
Female in production 
  
  
0.04 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
0.14* 
(0.07) 
0.13* 
(0.07) 
0.32* 
(0.18) 
0.24 
(0.18) 
0.42 
(1.16) 
0.41 
(1.17) 
-0.14 
(0.23) 
-0.17 
(0.23) 
Email 
  
  
1.60 
(1.22) 
1.51 
(1.22) 
3.42*** 
 (1.24) 
3.36*** 
(1.23) 
6.64* 
(3.73) 
5.57 
(3.65) 
-4.57 
(7.43) 
-4.23 
(7.40) 
0.11 
(3.62) 
0.21 
(3.61) 
Web 
  
  
0.80 
(0.98) 
0.91 
(0.98) 
-0.03 
(0.86) 
0.04 
(0.86) 
-6.30** 
(2.45) 
-5.27** 
(2.41) 
6.95 
(7.73) 
6.59 
(7.73) 
1.82 
(3.65) 
1.76 
(3.64) 
Dealing with regulations  
  
  
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.12* 
(0.07) 
0.12* 
(0.07) 
-0.04 
(0.22) 
-0.08 
(0.22) 
0.17 
(0.12) 
0.18 
(0.12) 
Technology transfer 
  
  
-3.72*** 
(1.39) 
-3.72*** 
(1.39) 
-0.93 
(1.38) 
-0.94 
(1.38) 
-10.93** 
(3.38) 
-11.15** 
(3.30) 
-15.02** 
(7.54) 
-15.88** 
(7.52) 
-4.10 
(3.62) 
-3.93 
(3.61) 
GDP 
  
  
4.10 
(3.74) 
4.48 
(3.74) 
-0.65 
(3.61) 
-0.14 
(3.61) 
-12.16 
(9.71) 
-13.93 
(9.49) 
-578.0 
(456.5) 
-586.10 
(453.8) 
85.94 
(750.6) 
48.20 
(748.2) 
Formal registration 
  
  
-5.11*** 
 (1.68) 
-5.03*** 
 (1.68) 
-4.89*** 
 (1.78) 
-4.79*** 
 (1.78) 
-4.34 
(3.62) 
-4.18 
(3.54) 
-11.84 
(7.49) 
-12.89* 
 (7.50) 
-2.65 
(4.03) 
-2.74 
(4.02) 
Female x Age group 2  
  
  
  
-32.56** 
(13.11) 
  
-37.36*** 
(10.75) 
  
-170.60** 
(26.12) 
  
-101.70* 
(55.40) 
  
37.96*** 
(13.50) 
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Female x Age group 3 
  
  
  
-35.45** 
(12.71) 
  
-31.98*** 
(10.35) 
  
-131.5** 
(24.24) 
  
-76.87* 
(46.40) 
  
7.56 
(8.67) 
Female x Age group 4  
  
  
  
-36.40** 
(12.66) 
  
-31.30*** 
(10.31) 
  
-138.9** 
(23.86) 
  
-99.38** 
(43.38) 
  
3.45 
(7.80) 
Female x Age group 5  
  
  
  
-41.05** 
(12.73) 
  
-36.52** 
(10.38) 
  
-143.7** 
(23.70) 
        
Female x Obstacle finance: 
moderate 
  
  
  
1.69 
(2.60) 
  
2.58 
(2.53) 
  
-3.97 
(9.61) 
  
-16.01 
(24.03) 
  
2.63 
(6.48) 
Female x Obstacle finance: severe  
  
  
  
-3.48 
(3.02) 
  
-4.84* 
(2.87) 
  
2.89 
(9.23) 
  
-33.26 
(24.31) 
  
3.78 
(7.82) 
Random effect variance constant  
3.45*** 
(0.01) 
3.99*** 
(0.01) 
3.50*** 
(0.01) 
3.28*** 
(0.01) 
3.28*** 
(0.01) 
3.35*** 
(0.02) 
3.33*** 
(0.02) 
4.14*** 
(0.03) 
4.13*** 
(0.03) 
3.64*** 
(0.02) 
3.63*** 
(0.02) 
N obs. 7203 7203 7203 5547 5547 910 910 590 590 1066 1066 
Chi2 (overall model) 113.66 113.66 130.29 120.20 142.44 86.28 136.40 26.00 33.81 32.87 42.98 
Log-likelihood -64739 -35505 -35496 -26124 -26114 -4348 -4326 -3285. -3282 -5397 -5392 
LR test mixed vs. linear model  225.44 78.50 81.52 36.2 36.5 55.47 53.68 112.51 110.25 47.25 40.28 
ICC 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.03 0.03 
Note: Significance is *0.1%. **0.05% and ***0.01%, does not include zero. The 90%, 95% and 99% confidence intervals do not include zero.  
Full sample=7203 firms in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. Industry and year controls suppressed to save space. Reference category for age group=0-3 years 
(start-up stage). Reference category for Obstacle finance =0, which is no constraint at all to access finance.  
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2014) during the 2007-2014 period for Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. 
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Table 4: Mixed effects multivariate regression (DV – Birch index (1987) of firm growth) 
  
baseline 
all firms 
all firms all firms India India 
India 
Global 
India 
Global 
Pakistan Pakistan Bangladesh Bangladesh 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Age group 2 (3-6 years)   
9.20 
(7.60) 
9.50 
(8.07) 
4.17 
(6.47) 
7.86 
(6.93) 
-8.73 
(10.50) 
16.13 
(11.61) 
50.85** 
(20.82) 
-13.61 
(21.54) 
22.85 
(32.98) 
14.35 
(33.08) 
Age group 3 (7-14 years)   
4.648 
(7.36) 
5.959 
(7.83) 
1.224 
(6.26) 
3.819 
(6.72) 
-15.14 
(9.58) 
5.362 
(10.62) 
14.44 
(8.98) 
8.281 
(7.62) 
15.99 
(32.24) 
14.55 
(32.22) 
Age group 4 (15-29 years)   
1.27 
(7.35) 
2.78 
(7.82) 
-0.40 
(6.25) 
1.62 
(6.71) 
-14.44 
(9.50) 
6.93 
(10.54) 
0.14 
(7.59) 
8.29 
(6.62) 
3.78 
(32.17) 
6.12 
(32.11) 
Age group 5 (>30 years)   
-0.18 
(7.43) 
3.44 
(7.91) 
-2.37 
(6.34) 
1.40 
(6.81) 
-16.24* 
(9.53) 
6.40 
(10.56) 
0.11 
(7.59) 
  
3.97 
(32.66) 
6.86 
(32.72) 
Female (H1)   
6.79*** 
(2.05) 
22.44* 
(13.76) 
-0.22 
(1.85) 
21.44 
(18.25) 
2.67 
(3.35) 
105.0*** 
(22.51) 
6.59 
(12.00) 
333.9*** 
(47.99) 
28.69*** 
(7.78) 
23.54*** 
(7.96) 
Exports   
0.22*** 
(0.03) 
0.22*** 
(0.03) 
0.24*** 
(0.03) 
0.24*** 
(0.03) 
0.18*** 
(0.06) 
0.18*** 
(0.06) 
0.24* 
(0.13) 
0.30** 
(0.12) 
-0.01 
(0.11) 
-0.01 
(0.11) 
Obstacle finance 
  
  
-1.74* 
(1.02) 
-1.30 
(1.15) 
-0.87 
(0.95) 
-0.27 
(1.08) 
-1.85 
(1.58) 
-0.92 
(1.77) 
-1.00 
(4.34) 
2.81 
(4.60) 
-4.66 
(3.86) 
-4.16 
(4.30) 
Female in non-production   
0.34*** 
(0.05) 
0.35*** 
(0.05) 
0.12** 
(0.05) 
0.12** 
(0.05) 
-0.13 
(0.11) 
-0.14 
(0.11) 
0.02 
(0.63) 
0.32 
(0.61) 
0.74*** 
(0.18) 
0.73*** 
(0.18) 
Female in production   
-0.07 
(0.14) 
-0.07 
(0.14) 
-0.04 
(0.13) 
-0.05 
(0.13) 
-0.02 
(0.17) 
-0.06 
(0.17) 
2.07 
(1.37) 
2.34* 
(1.33) 
0.30 
(0.55) 
0.25 
(0.55) 
Email   
5.86*** 
(2.17) 
5.61*** 
(2.17) 
2.21 
(2.18) 
2.16 
(2.19) 
5.26 
(3.58) 
4.28 
(3.53) 
-2.03 
(8.78) 
-0.42 
(8.42) 
8.67 
(8.91) 
9.42 
(8.89) 
Web   
11.79*** 
(1.76) 
11.88*** 
(1.76) 
8.44*** 
(1.53) 
8.44*** 
(1.53) 
1.260 
(2.35) 
1.955 
(2.33) 
13.02 
(9.13) 
10.08 
(8.80) 
25.09*** 
(9.00) 
24.86*** 
(8.98) 
Dealing with regulations    
0.15*** 
(0.05) 
0.15*** 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.27 
(0.26) 
0.21 
(0.25) 
1.22*** 
(0.29) 
1.22*** 
(0.29) 
Technology transfer   
-5.11** 
(2.49) 
-4.98** 
(2.49) 
-4.34* 
(2.42) 
-4.34* 
(2.42) 
-8.22** 
(3.25) 
-8.06** 
(3.20) 
-11.99 
(8.92) 
-13.64 
(8.58) 
6.78 
(8.85) 
6.59 
(8.84) 
GDP   
-1.92 
(5.41) 
-1.60 
(5.42) 
1.17 
(6.43) 
1.73 
(6.43) 
-6.73 
(9.32) 
-8.36 
(9.16) 
-285.9 
(540.33) 
-288.8 
(517.12) 
294.1 
(186.43) 
298.0 
(140.78) 
Formal registration   
-5.37* 
(3.02) 
-5.23* 
(3.02) 
-4.77 
(3.16) 
-4.67 
(3.16) 
-3.70 
(3.47) 
-3.24 
(3.42) 
-6.63 
(8.82) 
-7.77 
(8.51) 
-8.21 
(9.90) 
-8.94 
(9.87) 
Female x Age group 2      
-4.53 
(23.73) 
  
-30.03 
(19.18) 
  
-119.1** 
(25.21) 
  
-279.1*** 
(52.90) 
  
83.38** 
(33.28) 
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Female x Age group 3      
-13.61 
(22.99) 
  
-21.22 
(18.48) 
  
-83.84*** 
(23.40) 
  
-339.5*** 
(49.49) 
  
20.95 
(21.38) 
Female x Age group 4      
-15.16 
(22.90) 
  
-18.03 
(18.40) 
  
-100.6*** 
(23.03) 
  
-340.5*** 
(49.49) 
  
3.92 
(19.23) 
Female x Age group 5      
-26.96 
(23.04) 
  
-27.69 
(18.53) 
  
-110.2*** 
(20.88) 
        
Female x Obstacle finance moderate      
5.24 
(4.71) 
  
6.17 
(4.51) 
  
-9.70 
(9.28) 
  
-20.98 
(27.42) 
  
-15.20 
(15.94) 
Female x Obstacle finance severe      
-1.70 
(3.47) 
  
-4.95* 
(2.91) 
  
-7.91 
(6.91) 
  
-70.60** 
(27.74) 
  
-5.06 
(19.25) 
Random effect variance constant  
4.106*** 
(0.01) 
4.096*** 
(0.01) 
4.095*** 
(0.01) 
3.864*** 
(0.01) 
3.863*** 
(0.01) 
3.313*** 
(0.02) 
3.295*** 
(0.02) 
4.311*** 
(0.03) 
4.266*** 
(0.03) 
4.543*** 
(0.02) 
4.539*** 
(0.02) 
N obs. 7203 7203 7203 5547 5547 910 910 590 590 1066 1066 
Chi2 (overall model) 570.9 470.9 485.5 192.2 204.1 69.7 106.0 50.9 110.1 195.5 206.2 
Log-likelihood -73337 -39754 -39747 -29320 -29314 -4311 -4294 -3382 -3357 -6355 -6351 
LR test mixed vs. linear model 311.21 77.85 78.36 55.20 56.12 0.25 0.24 1.51 1.51 0.05 0.05 
ICC 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.02 0 0 
Note: Significance is *0.1%. **0.05% and ***0.01%, does not include zero. The 90%, 95% and 99% confidence intervals do not include zero.  
Full sample=7203 firms which includes firms in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. Industry and year controls suppressed to save space. Reference category for age 
group=0-3 years (start-up stage). Reference category for Obstacle finance =0 which is no constraint at all to access finance.  
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2014) during the 2007-2014 period for Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table A1: Robustness check - mixed effects multivariate regression (DV: difference in logarithms of sales per employee in a current 
year and three years ago) 
  
baseline 
all firms 
all firms all firms India India 
India 
Global 
India 
Global 
Pakistan Pakistan Bangladesh Bangladesh 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Age group 2 (3-6 years)   
-0.13 
(0.11) 
-0.20* 
(0.12) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
-0.03 
(0.09) 
0.10 
(0.19) 
-0.52** 
(0.26) 
0.49 
(0.76) 
0.32 
(0.91) 
-0.59** 
(0.23) 
-0.55** 
(0.23) 
Age group 3 (7-14 years)   
-0.14 
(0.11) 
-0.22** 
(0.11) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
-0.05 
(0.09) 
0.13 
(0.18) 
-0.42* 
(0.25) 
0.25 
(0.24) 
-0.02 
(0.20) 
-0.59*** 
(0.23) 
-0.57** 
(0.23) 
Age group 4 (15-29 years)   
-0.15 
(0.11) 
-0.23** 
(0.11) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
-0.06 
(0.09) 
0.11 
(0.18) 
-0.44* 
(0.25) 
0.34* 
(0.20) 
0.05 
(0.20) 
-0.61*** 
(0.23) 
-0.61*** 
(0.23) 
Age group 5 (>30 years)   
-0.183* 
(0.11) 
-0.23** 
(0.11) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
-0.06 
(0.09) 
0.11 
(0.18) 
-0.45* 
(0.25) 
0.31 
(0.22) 
0.09 
(0.15) 
-0.60*** 
(0.23) 
-0.57** 
(0.23) 
Female (H1)   
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.58* 
(0.30) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.38* 
(0.20) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
-1.13*** 
(0.36) 
-1.33*** 
(0.37) 
-2.85* 
(1.50) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.13) 
Exports   
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
Obstacle finance   
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01* 
(0.01) 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.26** 
(0.12) 
0.10 
(0.13) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
Female in non-production   
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
Female in production   
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
Email   
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
0.17 
(0.24) 
0.11 
(0.24) 
0.03 
(0.06) 
Web   
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.08*** 
(0.03) 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
-0.316 
(0.26) 
-0.42* 
(0.26) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
Dealing with regulations    
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
Technology transfer   
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.08*** 
(0.02) 
0.08*** 
(0.02) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.13*** 
(0.04) 
0.13*** 
(0.04) 
0.28 
(0.25) 
0.40 
(0.25) 
0.10* 
(0.06) 
GDP   
-0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.12) 
-0.03 
(0.12) 
-0.56 
(11.35) 
-2.08 
(11.05) 
8.42 
(12.29) 
Formal registration   
0.06** 
(0.03) 
0.06** 
(0.03) 
0.08*** 
(0.02) 
0.08*** 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.22) 
-0.09 
(0.21) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
Female x Age group 2      0.54*   0.38*   1.50***   2.01   -0.05 
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(0.31) (0.20) (0.39) (1.87) (0.23) 
Female x Age group 3      
0.62** 
(0.31) 
  
0.41** 
(0.20) 
  
1.11*** 
(0.37) 
  
0.26 
(1.50) 
  
0.07 
(0.15) 
Female x Age group 4      
0.57* 
(0.31) 
  
0.37* 
(0.20) 
  
1.10*** 
(0.36) 
  
0.24 
(1.40) 
  
0.09 
(0.13) 
Female x Age group 5      
0.45 
(0.31) 
  
0.40** 
(0.20) 
  
1.22*** 
(0.36) 
        
Female x Obstacle finance moderate      
-0.04 
(0.05) 
  
-0.05 
(0.03) 
  
0.03 
(0.13) 
  
1.15 
(0.86) 
  
-0.09 
(0.11) 
Female x Obstacle finance severe      
0.06 
(0.05) 
  
0.01 
(0.04) 
  
-0.04 
(0.12) 
  
3.36*** 
(0.89) 
  
-0.06 
(0.13) 
Random effect variance constant  
-2.67*** 
(0.19) 
-2.72*** 
(0.20) 
-2.71*** 
(0.19) 
-2.62*** 
(0.17) 
-2.62*** 
(0.17) 
-3.09*** 
(0.54) 
-3.20*** 
(0.57) 
-16.90 
(10.31) 
-20.18** 
(10.07) 
-2.43*** 
(0.52) 
-2.38*** 
(0.51) 
N obs. 6508 6508 6508 5127 5127 816 816 375 375 1006 1006 
Chi2 (overall model) 145.4 42.4 63.9 53.8 62.5 46.6 64.9 48.4 72.8 28.1 30.9 
Log-likelihood -10614 -5596 -5500 -1920 -1916 -293 -284 -698 -688 -955 -954 
LR test mixed vs. linear model 54.75 35.85 34.30 130.24 129.12 3.81 5.20 1.12 1.10 4.10 4.65 
ICC 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 
Note: Significance is *0.1%. **0.05% and ***0.01%, does not include zero. The 90%, 95% and 99% confidence intervals do not include zero.  
Sample=6,508 firms which includes firms in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. Industry and year controls suppressed to save space. Reference category for Age 
group=0-3 years (start-up stage). Reference category for Obstacle finance =0 which is no constraint at all to access finance.  
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys  (2014) during the 2007-2014 period on Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. 
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Figure A1: Women-owned firms in five stage of growth – Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan (2007-2014) 
 
Source: World Bank (2014)  
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